The Constitutional Infirmity
of RICO Forfeiture by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 4 Article 6
Fall 9-1-1989
The Constitutional Infirmity of RICO Forfeiture
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
The Constitutional Infirmity of RICO Forfeiture, 46 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 937 (1989),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol46/iss4/6
THE CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY OF RICO
FORFEITURE
The English common law recognized the criminal penalty of mandatory
estate forfeiture.' The penalty of estate forfeiture required an offender,
upon conviction of a felony, to forfeit all his real and personal property
to the state. 2 By enacting section 1963 of the Racketeer Influenced and
1. 1 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 160 (7th ed. London
1795). At English common law, a felony constituted "an offence which occasions a total
forfeiture of either lands or goods, or both, . . .; and to which capital or other punishment
may be superadded according to the degree of guilt." Id.; see generally 2 HAWKINS 477-489
(explaining English common-law forfeiture); HALE'S PLEAS OF THE CROWN *354-*370 (ex-
plaining English common-law penalty of forfeiture of estate including loss of dower and
corruption of blood). Despite modern misperceptions, in eighteenth century England a felony
could exist independent of capital punishment, and capital punishment could exist inde-
pendent of a felony. 1 HAWKINS, supra, at 160. For example, common-law heresy (not a
felony) required punishment by burning, a capital punishment, but conviction of heresy did
not require forfeiture of goods or property. Id. At English common law, the criminal
penalty of forfeiture determined which crimes were felonies. Id.
2. 2 HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 478-479. The English common law required a convicted
felon to forfeit all personal property to the king and all real property either to his lord or
to the king. Id. In addition to forfeiting all real property to a lord or to the king, a felon
at English common law forfeited to the king all rents and profits, including the profits of
a life estate or any inheritance rights that the offender's wife possessed. Id. at 478. Forfeiture
as a criminal penalty could only prejudice an offender and his heirs, not innocent third
parties. Id. at 485. The common law "saved" to innocent parties all rights, title, uses,
possession, entry, reversions, remainders, conditions, rents, leases, or other interests in the
land. Id. at 483. Moreover, if a felony statute specified that "no corruption of blood"
must occur or if the statute "saved to the heirs" the offender's land, the offender's wife
did not lose her dower rights and the offender's heirs could inherit the convicted offender's
land interests. Id. In all cases of forfeiture of real property, the forfeiture related back to
the time of the offense. Id. at 486-487.
In addition to resulting in the mandatory forfeiture of the offender's real property,
conviction of a felony also resulted in the mandatory forfeiture of the convicted offender's
personal property. Id. at 480. The personal property subject to forfeiture included all
personal property that the convicted offender actually possessed or to which the law entitled
the offender. Id. The offender's personal property subject to forfeiture, however, did not
include possessions that the offender held as an executor or as an administrator. Id. Upon
indicting an individual for a felony, the state inventoried the accused person's personal
property and required the accused person's family or neighbors to hold all of the property
until disposition of the criminal case against the accused. Id. at 487. The government,
however, could not seize any of the accused person's property until a court convicted the
accused person. Id. at 488. Unlike forfeiture of real property, forfeiture of an offender's
personal estate related back to the time of conviction as opposed to the time of the offense.
Id. at 486-487.
In addition to causing mandatory forfeiture of an offender's real and personal estate,
English common-law conviction for a felony often carried the condition of "corruption of
blood." Id. at 493-495. Corruption of blood prohibited the convicted offender from
inheriting land as an heir. Id. at 493. Also, corruption of blood prohibited any person from
deriving any title to land from the convicted offender. Id. at 493-494. A pardon could not
restore a convicted offender's ability to inherit land or to pass land to any person alive at
the time of the offender's conviction. Id. at 495.
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Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in 1970, the United States Congress
revived the English common-law criminal penalty of forfeiture.' Congress
enacted RICO to prevent organized crime from infiltrating legitimate
business. 4 In particular, Congress attempted to prohibit convicted RICO
offenders from retaining control of the enterprises that the offenders
influenced through their illegal racketeering activities. 5 Consequently, in
section 1963 of RICO, Congress implemented as a mandatory criminal
penalty for a racketeering offense forfeiture to the United States Govern-
ment of the convicted offender's interest in all corrupted enterprises.6 A
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982 and Supp. 1986) (imposing forfeiture as mandatory
penalty for racketeering violations); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1969). In
the Senate Report of the legislative history of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary states that
Congress derived the RICO penalty of forfeiture directly from the English common-law
criminal penalty of forfeiture of estate. Id. at 79. Moreover, the Senate report expressly
states that Congress believed that by enacting § 1963 of RICO Congress was reviving the
English common-law penalty of estate forfeiture. Id. at 80. The Senate report justified
reviving the English common-law criminal penalty of estate forfeiture by relying on Black-
stone's reasoning. Id. Blackstone reasoned that society is the foundation of all property,
and when an individual violates the laws of society, the offender breaches his contract of
association with society and forfeits his right to the lands that the offender initially derived
from society. 16 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *299-*300; see also S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1969) (using Blackstone's reasoning to justify § 1963 forfeiture).
Consequently, Blackstone reasoned that the government acted for society and resumed
possession of the offender's lands. BLACKSTONE, supra, at *299-*300. Congress used Black-
stone's "social compact" reasoning to justify § 1963's forfeiture penalty. S. REP. No. 617,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1969).
4. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76-78 (1969) (stating Congressional
purpose behind RICO forfeiture penalty). In the Senate Report of the legislative history of
RICO, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary noted that organized crime had invaded
almost all types of commercial industries, production industries, and entertainment industries.
Id. at 77. Congress believed that the RICO forfeiture penalty would prohibit convicted
organized crime leaders from retaining their sources of economic power. Id. at 80. Conse-
quently, Congress believed that new organized crime leaders would not be able to succeed
the convicted organized crime leaders. Id. As a result, any conviction of an organized crime
leader under RICO would remove the overall influence of organized crime in a given
industry. Id.
5. See id. at 78 (explaining that government must deprive convicted felon of property-
to prevent retention of control by new members of organized crime syndicate). The legislative
history of RICO in the report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary asserted that the
laws prior to RICO could not remove effectively criminal influences from legitimate enter-
prises. Id. The Senate report stated that attacking an offender's economic base proves
necessary to eliminating an offender's influence over a given enterprise. Id. at 79.
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), (b) (1982 & Supp. 1986) (imposing mandatory forfeiture
penalty for racketeering offenders). Section 1963 of RICO requires an offender guilty of a
RICO racketeering offense to forfeit any interest in, security of, claim against, or property
or contractual right in any enterprise that the offender established or operated by engaging
in illegal racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(I)-(2). Moreover, §1963 requires a RICO
offender to forfeit to the government all profits that the offender derived from the enterprise
and all property that the offender acquired with those profits. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3).
Property subject to forfeiture under RICO includes all real property and all tangible and
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convicted offender's forfeitable interest includes all profits that the of-
fender derived from racketeering activity and all real and personal property
that the offender obtained with these profits. 7 In formulating section 1963,
Congress directly derived the RICO section 1963 punishment from the
English common-law criminal penalty of forfeiture.8 Moreover, Congress
recognized that it was creating new punishment unprecedented in American
law.9
The Framers of the United States Constitution ("Framers") and the
members of the First Federal Congress, however, expressly rejected the
English common-law criminal penalty of forfeiture.' 0 The treason clause
of the United States Constitution, as well as the clauses of the Constitution
that prohibit the federal and state governments from passing bills of
attainder, expressly prohibit the English common-law criminal penalty of
forfeiture." Moreover, the First Federal Congress expressly prohibited the
intangible personal property including rights, privileges, interests, claims and securities. 18
U.S.C. § 1963(b). RICO's definition of forfeitable property includes all real and personal
property that the offender possessed prior to committing the racketeering offense. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(c). The penalty of forfeiture under § 1963, however, operates only upon conviction
of a RICO defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c). Upon conviction of the RICO offender, the
government may seize all property that RICO subjects to forfeiture. Id. RICO defines
racketeering activity as any state law felony offense that involves an act or threat of murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or narcotics exchanges. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1)(a). Racketeering activity also includes any federal offense relating to bribery,
sports bribery, counterfeiting, or theft from interstate shipping. Id. Moreover, RICO
racketeering includes embezzlement from pension or welfare funds, extortionate credit
transactions, transmission of gambling information, mail fraud, wire fraud, or obstruction
of justice. Id. In addition, RICO defines racketeering as any felony offense relating to
criminal investigations or local law enforcement, interference with commerce, robbery,
extortion, interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia, or unlawful welfare fund
payments. Id. Further, RICO racketeering includes illegal gambling businesses, interstate
transportation of stolen property, contraband trafficking of cigarettes," white slave traffic,
restrictions on payments and loans to unions, embezzlement from union funds, or any
narcotics offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(b)-(c). RICO defines an enterprise as any legal entity
or association in fact not a legal entity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (1984 & Supp. 1986); see supra note 6 and accompanying
text (explaining meaning of forfeitable interest under § 1963).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (1984 & Supp. 1986); see S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 79-80 (1969) (stating in legislative history of RICO that Congress directly derived
§ 1963 penalty from English common-law forfeiture); supra note 3 and accompanying text
(explaining legislative history of RICO in Senate Report).
9. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80 (1969) (stating in legislative
history of RICO that Congress recognized § 1963 penalty was unprecedented in American
law); supra note 3 and accompanying text (explaining legislative history of RICO in Senate
report).
10. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cI. 2 (prohibiting use of forfeiture as criminal
penalty for treason ("treason clause"); An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes
Against the United States, 1st Cong., 2d Sess., Act of April 30, 1790, § 24 (prohibiting use
of forfeiture as criminal penalty for all federal crimes); infra notes 88-127 and accompanying
text (explaining historical significance of treason clause and § 24 of Punishment of Crimes
Bill of 1790).
11. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (stating that no conviction of treason shall
19891
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use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty in section 24 of the first Punishment
of Crimes Bill in 1790.12 Congress later codified this prohibition on criminal
forfeiture in section 3563 of Title 18 of the United States Code. 3 Con-
sequently, forfeiture as a criminal penalty was unknown to American law
until Congress enacted RICO in 1970.14 Congress' revival of forfeiture as
a criminal penalty in section 1963 necessarily repealed the First Congress'
one hundred eighty year old express prohibition on the use of forfeiture
as a criminal penalty. 5 Furthermore, examination of the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution and the members of the First Congress
demonstrates that section 1963 unconstitutionally punishes criminal offen-
ders.16
An examination of the English common-law forfeiture penalties is
necessary to understand the historical significance of the intent of the
Framers and the members of the First Congress.' 7 Two distinct types of
forfeiture existed at English common law. a8 The first and most prevalent
use of forfeiture was the mandatory criminal penalty that attached upon
a defendant's conviction of any felony offense. 19 The English common
law, however, also recognized the penalty of seizure, a civil forfeiture that
evolved from the theory of deodand. 20 The English common-law deodand
theory required the forfeiture of any instrumentality or object (the "deo-
result in corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (stating
that Congress cannot pass bills of attainder); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (stating that
no state can pass bills of attainder); infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (discussing
treason clause and prohibition on bills of attainder).
12. See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, Ist
Cong., 2d Sess., Act of April 30, 1790 § 24 (prohibiting use of forfeiture as criminal penalty
for any crime); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 2220 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (providing text of § 24 of Act
of April 30, 1790).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982) (originally enacted as § 24 of Act of April 30, 1790),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, c.II, § 212(a)(2), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1987
(stating that no conviction shall result in corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate).
14. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1969) (stating that prior to enactment
of § 1963 criminal forfeiture was unprecedented in American history); supra note 3 (discussing
legislative history of RICO in Senate Report).
15. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80, 160 (1969) (stating that § 1963
impliedly repeals 18 U.S.C. § 3563). In the Senate Report of the legislative history of RICO,
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary states that § 1963(a) repeals § 3563 by implication.
Id. at 80. Moreover, the Senate Report expressly states that insofar as 18 U.S.C. § 3563
applies to forfeiture, § 3563 is no longer the law. Id. at 160.
16. See infra notes 88-127 and accompanying text (examining intent of Framers and
members of First Congress).
17. See infra notes 18-28 and accompanying text (distinguishing English common-law
seizure from English common use of forfeiture as criminal penalty).
18. See infra notes 18-28 and accompanying text (distinguishing English common-law
seizure from use of forfeiture as criminal punishment).
19. See supra notes 1, 2 and accompanying text (explaining English common-law use
of forfeiture as criminal punishment).
20. See Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1922) (explaining
that civil seizure evolved from concept of deodand).
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dand") that caused the death of a person, regardless of whether the death
was intentional or accidental, and regardless of the guilt or innocence of
the owner of the property. 21 The deodand practice evolved from the
rationale that forfeiting the instrumentality that caused death would expiate
the soul of the deceased person.22 Modern civil seizure adopted the deodand
rationale's personification that an instrumentality that an offender used
to commit an offense is "guilty.
'23
Modern civil forfeiture is a civil sanction that allows the state or
federal government to seize the property that a criminal offender used to
commit a crime.4 For example, a yacht owner who leases a yacht subjects
that yacht to government seizure if the lessee uses the yacht to commit
an unlawful act.25 If the lessee uses the yacht to smuggle narcotics into
the United States, for example, the government may seize the yacht by
commencing a civil seizure action against the yacht itself.2 6 The guilt or
innocence of the yacht owner is completely unrelated to the government's
civil seizure proceeding against the yacht.27 The illegal use of the property,
21. See 1 W. HAwrn.is, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 161-163 (7th ed.
London 1795) (explaining English common-law theory of deodand). Under English common
law, when an animal or any inanimate object caused the death of a man, the instrument
that caused the death was a "deodand" that society forfeited to the king. Id. at 161.
Deodand included all weapons that individuals used in legal duels as well as unlawful
murders. Id. Forfeiture of deodand did not depend on any finding of fault. Id. For example,
if an individual accidentally fell from a cart, the cart was a deodand subject to forfeiture
to the king. Id.
22. Id. The deodand rationale probably evolved from ancient Mosaical law and ancient
Athenian law. See Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-511 (1922)
(explaining English theory of deodand). Ancient Mosaical law required that a community
stone to death any ox that gored a person, and the ancient law prohibited the community
from eating the flesh of the stoned ox. Id. Ancient Athenian law exterminated or banished
any animal or instrumentality that caused a man's death. Id.
23. See Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 510 (explaining relationship of civil seizure
to English common-law deodand).
24. See id. at 511-513 (explaining modern civil seizure); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 1, *14-*16 (1827) (distinguishing English common-law use of forfeiture as criminal
punishment from civil seizure actions against tainted property); Maxeiner, Bane of American
Forfeiture Law-Banished At Last?, 62 CONELL L. Rv. 768, 784-785 (1977) (explaining
civil seizure in American law); Note, A Proposal to Reform Criminal Forfeiture Under
RICO and CCE, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1929, 1932-1934 (1984) (explaining civil seizure in United
States today).
25. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-686 (1974)
(holding that government can seize through civil action owner's yacht that lessee used to
smuggle narcotics).
26. See id. (explaining government seizure of yacht that lessee used to smuggle
narcotics); supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (explaining that civil seizure is govern-
ment action against property that offender used illegally); infra notes 27-28 and accompa-
nying text (same).
27. See Calero-Toledo, 46 U.S. at 680-686 (explaining government can -seize yacht that
lessee used to smuggle narcotics); supra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining that
guilt or innocence of owner of property is wholly unrelated to civil seizure action).
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not the guilt or innocence of the owner, triggers the civil seizure sanction. 2
Both the common-law imposition of forfeiture as-a criminal penalty
and the civil seizure sanction carried over from England to the American
colonies. 29 The American colonies embraced the civil seizure sanction. 30 In
Virginia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New Hamp-
shire, Connecticut, Maine and New York, colonial governments brought
common-law actions against "guilty" property.3 ' Most often the colonial
governments maintained common-law actions against ships or cargo to
enforce the provisions of the English Navigation Acts.3 2 The colonists,
however, did not embrace the English common-law use of forfeiture as a
criminal penalty.3 3 In New York, for example, where the English colonial
government attempted to implement the mandatory criminal penalty of
forfeiture, colonial New York juries consistently reported that the offender
had no real or personal property, thus circumventing the operation of the
forfeiture penalty.3 4 In Massachusetts, the colonists abolished altogether
28. See Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 513 (stating that criminal offender's illegal
use of property is only consideration in civil seizure actions and that guilt or innocence of
owner of property is fortuitous).
29. See C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 153 (1943) (explaining that English
common-law forfeiture and seizure existed in United States in colonies prior to adoption of
Constitution); Maxeiner, supra note 24, at 774-778 (explaining that forfeiture law in American
colonies included criminal penalty of forfeiture and civil seizure).
30. See C.J. Hendry Co., 318 U.S. at 140-143 n.4 (explaining that colonies unanimously
used civil seizure sanction).
31. See id. (detailing colonial use of common-law civil seizure actions against tainted
property for customs and navigation violations).
32. See id. (explaining actions to enforce English Navigations Acts); Maxeiner, supra
note 24, at 774 (explaining English Navigations Acts). The English Navigation Acts were
the broadest of the English civil seizure statutes. Maxeiner, supra note 24, at 774. The
English Navigation Acts provided that only English built and English manned ships could
transport goods to the colonies. Id. If an individual crew member or a shipowner violated
the Acts, the government could seize the ship and all goods the ship was carrying. Id. An
individual seaman who violated the Acts without the knowledge of the shipowner or the
master of the seaman's ship could cause the seizure of the entire ship. Id.
33. See 1 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CIamNAL LAW § 970 (6th ed. 1877)
(stating that American law did not favor use of forfeiture as criminal penalty); 2 J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMmRICAN LAW *317 (stating that common-law forfeiture fell into dis-
repute in American colonies); infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (explaining colonists'
rejection of use of forfeiture as criminal penalty).
34. See J. GOEBEL AND T.R. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL Naw YORK
710-717 (1970) (discussing English government's use of escheat and forfeiture in colonial
New York). In the late seventeenth century case of the Leisler Rebellions, after convicting
Leisler and others of treason, the colonial New York jury in the case refused to report that
any of the convicted offenders possessed forfeitable lands, tenements or chattels. Id. at 713.
After the Leisler Rebellion, the English courts did not attempt to enforce forfeiture as a
criminal penalty until the treason cases of Hutchins and Bayard in the early eighteenth
century. Id. at 714. In the Hutchins and Bayard cases, the colonists charged the English
government with bringing the treason actions against Hutchins and Bayard solely to enforce
forfeiture of the Hutchins' and Bayard's estates. Id. The colonists anticipated that the
English colonial government planned to use the proceeds from the estates to balance the
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the criminal penalty of forfeiture. 3 At the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, therefore, the American common law had absorbed the civil
seizure sanction, while the colonists had rejected the English common-law
use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty.
36
In drafting the Constitution and the first laws of the national govern-
ment, the Framers and the members of the First Federal Congress followed
the trend of the colonies and adopted civil seizure but rejected imposition
of forfeiture as a criminal penalty.17 In the text of the Constitution, the
Framers expressly rejected the use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty.38
Article III, section three, clause two of the Constitution (the treason
clause) expressly prohibits the English common-law criminal penalty of
forfeiture for treason.39 In addition to prohibiting the penalty of forfeiture
in the treason clause, the Framers also rejected the criminal penalty of
forfeiture by prohibiting both the national government and the state
governments from passing bills of attainder. 40 At English common law,
bills of attainder were legislative bills that originated in Parliament and
convicted specifically named individuals of criminal offenses. 41 Bills of
local budget. Id. Subsequently, the colonial New York legislature restored the forfeited
property to Bayard and Hutchins. Id. After the Hutchins and Bayard cases, juries in
eighteenth century New York consistently refused to report that a convicted felon possessed
any lands, tenements, or chattels that the felon could forfeit to the state. Id. at 715. Because
a jury finding that a convicted offender possessed lands and chattels was necessary to any
use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty, refusal to report any lands or chattels effectively
circumvented the criminal penalty of forfeiture in colonial New York. Id. at 715. The only
exception to the New York juries' failure to report a defendant's lands and chattels was the
state's enforcement of deodand forfeiture of instrumentalities that caused death. Id. at 717;
see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing civil sanction of seizing instrumen-
talities of crime).
35. 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *427.
36. See C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 153 (1943) (concluding that American
colonists had accepted civil seizure in United States at time of adopting United States
Constitution); supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (explaining.that American colonies
rejected use of forfeiture as criminal penalty).
37. See infra notes 88-127 and accompanying text (explaining that Framers of Consti-
tution and members of First Congress rejected use of forfeiture as criminal penalty).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 -(prohibiting use of forfeiture as criminal
punishment for treason).
39. Id.
40. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cI. 3 (prohibiting national government from passing
bills of attainder); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting state government from passing
bills of attainder); Maxeiner, supra note 24, at 779 (stating that constitutional prohibition
on bills of attainder is in part reaction to colonists' distaste for use of forfeiture as criminal
penalty); infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (explaining that when Framers prohibited
bills of attainder, Framers in effect prohibited criminal penalty of forfeiture).
41. See C.E. STEVENS, SOURCES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSm-
EKED IN RELATION TO COLONIAL AND ENGLISH HISTORY, 97-98 n.1 (2d ed. 1894) (explaining
English procedure in passing bills of attainder); Note, Beyond Process: A Substantive
Rationale For The Bill of Attainder Clause, 70 VA. L. Rav. 475, 477 (1984) (explaining
English common-law bills of attainder and stating that Framers prohibited English practice
of bills of attainder in United States Constitution).
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attainder, like common-law felony convictions, triggered the mandatory
penalty of forfeiture. 42 In prohibiting bills of attainder, the Framers,
therefore, expressed a further rejection of the use of forfeiture as a criminal
penalty.
43
The First Federal Congress implemented the civil sanction of seizure
in the customs and navigation laws of 1789 and 1790." Since 1789, civil
seizure actions by the United States government against tainted property
have continued to the present. 45 The First Federal Congress, however,
expressly prohibited the use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty in section
24 of the first Punishment of Crimes Bill in 1790.46 Congress later codified
section 24 in section 3563 of Title 18 of the United States Code.4 7 When
Congress enacted RICO in 1970, Congress recognized that section 1963 of
RICO impliedly repealed section 3563 of Title 18 .48 Later, when Congress
amended RICO in 1984, Congress expressly abolished section 3563.
49
Section 3563, however, arguably expressed the necessary implications of
42. See 2 HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 483 (explaining that criminal penalty of forfeiture
applied to conviction by bills of attainder as well as felony convictions by jury trial).
43. See Maxeiner, supra note 24, at 779 (explaining that Framers prohibited bills of
attainder as part of effort to follow colonial trend that abolished forfeiture as penalty in
American law). The English common-law treatise writers all explained that bills of attainder
triggered the mandatory penalty of forfeiture. See 2 HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 483
(assimilating English common-law treatise explaining forfeiture was mandatory penalty that
attached upon legislative attainder). Because these English common-law treatises were the
primary sources of legal scholars at the time of the framing and adoption of the Constitution,
the Framers must have been aware of the forfeiture consequences of bills of attainder. See
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 594-595 at nn.36,38 (1980) (explaining that sources of
Framers were English common-law treatise writers Coke, Hale, and Hawkins). Moreover,
Chief Justice John Marshall has explained that the Framers of the Constitution believed
that bills of attainder may affect the life of an individual or confiscate an individual's
property, thus further illustrating that the Framers were aware that bills of attainder caused
the penalty of forfeiture at English common law. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
*87 (1810) (explaining consequences of bills of attainder as death or confiscation of property).
44. See Act of July 31, 1789 §§ 12, 34, 36 (Customs Laws providing for seizure of
property that persons used to smuggle goods into United States and for seizure of smuggled
goods); Act of August 5, 1790 §§ 13, 22, 67 (providing for civil seizure of property that
individuals used to violate Customs and Revenue Laws); I ANNALS OF CONG. 2146, 2156,
1168-1195 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (reprinting text of Customs and Revenue Laws).
45. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984) (upholding
congressional authority to authorize civil seizure of property that individual used illegally).
46. See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, Ist
Cong., 2d Sess. § 24 (April 30, 1790) (prohibiting use of forfeiture as criminal penalty for
all federal crimes); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 2220 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (reprinting text of § 24 of
Act of April 30, 1790).
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982) (stating that no felony conviction shall work corruption
of blood or any forfeiture of estate).
48. See S. REp. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80, 125, 160 (1969) (stating that by
enacting § 1963 of RICO, Congress necessarily repealed by implication § 3563 of Title 18
of the United States Code); supra note 3 (detailing legislative history of § 1963 of RICO).
49. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, c. II, § 212(a)(2), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1987
(repealing 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982)).
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the treason clause of the Constitution. 50 Under this argument any criminal
penalty that repeals section 3563, in effect, repeals a constitutional doc-
trine.5' Section 1963, therefore, arguably constitutes an unconstitutional
revival of the use of forfeiture.
5 2
Despite Congress' express recognition that RICO's criminal penalty of
forfeiture repeals section 3563, courts in the United States have rejected
attacks on the constitutionality of RICO's forfeiture penalty.5 3 In United
States v. Thevis,5 4 the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia considered whether section 1963's forfeiture penalty was con-
stitutional.5 5 Counts I and II of the indictment in Thevis charged the
defendant with conducting the business of an enterprise through a pattern
of racketeering activity in violation of section 1962(c) of RICO.5 6 In Thevis
the defendant, in moving to dismiss the RICO counts of the indictment,
argued that the forfeiture penalty provisions of RICO* were unconstitu-
tional.57 Specifically, the defendant in Thevis contended that the treason
clause of the Constitution barred section 1963's forfeiture penalty.5s The
defendant in Thevis argued that the treason clause of the Constitution, in
prohibiting forfeiture of a defendant's estate upon conviction of the
defendant for treason, necessarily prohibits the penalty of forfeiture of
estate for all crimes of a lesser degree.
5 9
50. See infra notes 95-118 and accompanying text (explaining that treason clause
impliedly prohibits use of forfeiture as penalty for all other crimes and § 3563 is mere
expression of this implication).
51. See infra notes 119-128 and accompanying text (explaining that because § 3563
states implications of treason clause, use of any penalty that repeals § 3563 offends U.S.
Constitution).
52. Id.
53. See infra notes 54-83 and accompanying text (explaining that United States District
Court for Northern District of Georgia and United States Court of Appeals for Fourth
Circuit have rejected attacks on constitutionality of § 1963 of RICO).
54. 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
55. See United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 140-144 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (addressing
defendant's arguments that § 1963's use of forfeiture as criminal penalty for violations of
RICO violates fifth amendment's guarantee of due process, constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of eighth amendment, and violates treason clause).
56. See id. at 136-137 (stating that count I of indictment charged defendant with
substantive violation of § 1962(c) and count II of indictment charged defendant with
conspiracy to violate § 1962(c)).
57. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 136 (N.D. Ga. 1979); see infra note 58
and accompanying text (explaining defendant's attack on constitutionality of § 1963's
forfeiture penalty).
58. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 140. The defendant in Thevis claimed that § 1963 was
unconstitutionally vague and that § 1963's forfeiture penalty constituted a cruel and unusual
disproportionate penalty that violated the eighth amendment to the Constitution. Id. In
addition to the defendant's fifth and eighth amendment arguments, the defendant alleged
that § 1963's forfeiture penalty violated the treason clause. Id.; see generally Winters,
Criminal RICO Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: "Rough" Justice Is Not Enough,
14 HAsTiNGs CONsT. L.Q. 451 (1987) (analyzing constitutionality of RICO forfeiture penalty
under eighth amendment to Constitution).
59. See Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 140 (stating defendant's argument that treason clause's
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In addressing the defendant's arguments, the district court in Thevis
first recognized that the Constitution prohibits the penalty of forfeiture
of estate upon conviction of treason. 0- Moreover, the district court noted
that the First Congress' prohibition of forfeiture of estate has barred
forfeiture of a defendant's estate upon the defendant's conviction of a
federal crime since 1790.61 The district court further recognized that
legislatures in the United States both before and after the ratification of
the Constitution have enacted civil seizure statutes that permit government
seizure of tainted property.62 The district court in Thevis reasoned that,
because statutes that permit the civil sanction of seizure result in forfeiture
of tainted property, the First Congress' prohibition on forfeiture as a
criminal penalty did not prohibit forfeiture of the instrumentalities of a
crime.6 3 Consequently, the district court in Thevis reasoned that because
Congress limited sqction 1963's forfeiture penalty to a convicted offender's
interest in a corrupted enterprise, section 1963 fell within the limits of the
permissible seizure of tainted property 4 The Thevis court, therefore,
concluded that the treason clause of the Constitution and the First Pun-
ishment of Crimes Bill do not render the RICO criminal forfeiture penalty
unconstitutional.6 5
Similarly, in United States v. Grande,66 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined the legitimacy of section 1963's
penalty of forfeiture in light of the defendant's constitutional attack.67 In
Grande, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
convicted five defendants of conducting racketeering activity in the city
of Baltimore in violation of section 1962(c) of RICO.6 8 After convicting
prohibition on use of forfeiture as penalty for treason prohibits use of forfeiture as penalty
for all felonious conduct).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. (acknowledging that legislative bodies in U.S. before and after adoption
of United States Constitution consistently enacted seizure laws effecting property that
offender used to commit a criminal offense).
63. See id. at 140-141 (reasoning that although § 3563 of Title 18 of United States
Code barred imposition of forfeiture of estate as criminal penalty, no constitutional or
statutory barrier prohibits limited forfeiture of property that offender used to violate criminal
law).
64. See id. at 141 (reasoning that since § 1963 of RICO encompasses only property
that offender used in committing substantive RICO offense, treason clause does not proscribe
§ 1963 forfeiture penalty).
65. Id.
66. 620 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1980).
67. See United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1037-1039 (4th Cir. 1980) (addressing
defendant's argument that treason clause of Constitution prohibits § 1963's imposition of
estate forfeiture as criminal penalty).
68. United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (4th Cir. 1980). In Grande several
Baltimore city demolition contractors conspired with the Director of the Department of
Housing and Community Development, Division of Construction and Building Maintenance,
to ensure profits by underbidding other contractors. Id. Grande, the director, supplied
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one defendant, Berg, of securing demolition contracts by violating RICO,
the jury in Grande found that Berg had a fifty percent interest in a
particular wrecking company. 69 Pursuant to section 1963 of RICO, the
district court ordered Berg to forfeit his interest in the wrecking company.
70
Berg appealed the district court's order to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.7' The defendant in Grande, like the
defendant in Thevis, contended that the treason clause of the Constitution
rendered the RICO criminal forfeiture provision unconstitutional.
7 2
In addressing the defendant's claims, the Fourth Circuit in Grande
first noted that, if section 1963 of RICO revived forfeiture of estate, the
section 1963 penalty would be repugnant to the treason clause of the
Constitution which impliedly prohibits the use of forfeiture as a criminal
penalty for all crimes.7 3 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit in* Grande con-
.sidered whether the RICO forfeiture penalty repealed the First Punishment
of Crimes Bill, which codified the implication of the treason clause by
prohibiting forfeiture of estate as a criminal penalty for all federal crimes.
7 4
In considering whether section 1963 repealed the First Punishment of
Crimes Bill, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the English commom-law criminal
penalty of forfeiture. 75 The Fourth Circuit recognized that the American
information to the demolition contractors concerning the city's cost estimate for a given
project. Id. The "ring" of demolition contractors used the information that Grande supplied
them to submit low bids, each contractor taking a turn to submit the lowest bid. Id. The
contractors paid Grande five percent of each contract. Id.
69. See id. at 1037 (stating that jury returned special verdict announcing that Berg
had 50% interest in Buzz Berg Wrecking Co.).
70. Id. The jury in Grande rendered a special verdict, in which the jury found that
one of the defendants, Berg, possessed a fifty percent interest in the Buzz Berg Wrecking
Company, Inc. Id. Accordingly, the district court entered a restraining order that prevented
Berg from transferring his interest in the company and ordering Berg to forfeit his interest
to the state. Id. Berg appealed the district court's forfeiture order to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Id. On appeal, Berg challenged the constitutionality
of § 1963's forfeiture provisions. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. In Grande the defendant challenged § 1963 of RICO on two grounds. Id. First,
the defendant contended that the treason clause of the Constitution prohibits the imposition
of forfeiture as a criminal penalty for all felonies because prohibiting the imposition of
forfeiture as a penalty for treason impliedly prohibits imposition of forfeiture as a penalty
for all other crimes. Id. The defendant also challenged § 1963's forfeiture penalty by arguing
that § 1963 of RICO violates the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at 1039; see generally Winters, supra note 58, at 470-484 (analyzing
constitutionality of RICO forfeiture penalty under eighth amendment cruel and unusual
punishment standards).
73. Grande, 620 F.2d at 1038. The Fourth Circuit in Grande recognized that to hold
that the use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty is not legitimate for treason but is legitimate
for lesser felony offenses would be irrational. Id. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit determined
that if § 1963's forfeiture penalty revived English common-law forfeiture of estate, the
RICO penalty would be unconstitutional. Id.
74. See id. at 1038-1039 (examining whether § 1963 of RICO repealed § 3563 of Title
18 of the United States Code).
75. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Grande noted that under English common law, the
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colonies rejected the English use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty.7 6 The
Grande court further noted that consequently the Framers and members
of the First Congress prohibited the use of English common-law forfeiture
as a criminal penalty in the United States.7 7 The Fourth Circuit emphasized
that the First Punishment of Crimes Bill supplemented the treason clause's
prohibition on the use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty by expressly
prohibiting the use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty for all federal
crimes.7 8 From this historical background, the Fourth Circuit in Grande
determined that the Framers and the First Congress intended that the
treason clause of the Constitution and section 24 of the First Punishment
of Crimes Bill would prohibit the forfeiture of a convicted offender's
entire estate, as well ag the total disinheritance of the offender's heirs.79
The Fourth Circuit further reasoned that Congress limited section 1963's
forfeiture penalty to an offender's interest in a corrupted enterprise. s0 The
Grande court determined that the object of section 1963 was the forfeiture
of the instrumentalities of a crime, and that no significant differences
exist between section 1963's criminal penalty of forfeiture and civil seizure
sanctions by the government against tainted property. 8' The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that, because the Framers and the First Congress intended to
prohibit only the forfeiture of an offender's entire estate and not an
offender's limited interest in a corrupted enterprise, section 1963's forfei-
ture penalty did not unconstitutionally repeal section 24 of the First
Punishment of Crimes Bill. 2 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit in Grande
concluded that section 1963 did not unconstitutionally revive the use of
forfeiture as a criminal penalty that the treason clause of the Constitution
prohibits.83
forfeiture penalty defined felony offenses. Id. The Fourth Circuit further noted that the
English common-law forfeiture penalty forced a defendant to forfeit all the defendant's real
and personal property as a consequence of the defendant's felony conviction. Id.
76. See id. at 1039 (acknowledging that forfeiture found little favor in American
colonies).
77. See id. (noting that in 1787 Constitution banned imposition of forfeiture of estate
for treason and that three years later First Congress abolished penalty of forfeiture for all
convictions).
78. See id. at 1037-38 (recognizing that § 3563 of Title 18 of United States Code
supplemented treason clause's prohibition on forfeiture penalty for treason).
79. See id. at 1039 (stating that treason clause and subsequent First Congress statute
of 1790 contemplated only broad forfeiture that completely disinherited offender's heirs and
resulted in total confiscation of offender's estate).
80. See id. (stating that § 1963 seeks to accomplish forfeiture of instrumentalities of
crime).
81. See id. (stating that fact that § 1963 penalty of forfeiture operates upon adjudi-
cation of guilt of defendant whereas seizure is civil action against property is of little
significance). The Fourth Circuit in Grande reasoned that because RICO's use of forfeiture
as a criminal penalty is effectively the same as civil seizure of property that an offender





The reasoning of both the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia in Thevis and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in Grande is flawed. s4 Primarily, both courts underes-
timated the significance of the historical background behind the Framers'
and the First Congress' prohibition on forfeiture as a criminal penalty in
the formative years of American law. 5 Moreover, both courts misinter-
preted the significant distinction between permissible civil seizure and the
outlawed criminal penalty of forfeiture.16 Last, both courts plainly mis-
understood the scope of RICO forfeiture.
s7
First, both the Thevis and the Grande courts underestimated the
significance of the constitutional prohibition on the use of forfeiture as a
criminal penalty for treason and the First Congress' subsequent prohibition
on the use of forfeiture as a penalty for federal criminal offenses."8 The
Framers of the Constitution expressly prohibited the national government
from punishing treason by forcing a convicted traitor to forfeit his property
to the state. 9 Very little debate occurred over the treason clause of the
Constitution." The debate that did occur reveals concerns over the defi-
nition of the crime of treason, not over the punishment for treason. 91
84. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (explaining why reasoning of Grande
court and Thevis court is unsound).
85. See infra notes 88-127 and accompanying text (examining historical significance of
treason clause and First Punishment of Crimes Bill of April 30, 1790).
86. See infra notes 128-136 and accompanying text (examining significance of historical
distinction between civil seizure and use of forfeiture as criminal penalty).
87. See infra notes 137-148 and accompanying text (examining broad scope of criminal
forfeiture penalty in § 1963 of RICO).
88. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text (explaining that Framers and members
of First Congress rejected imposition of forfeiture as criminal penalty); infra notes 89-127
(explaining significance of Framers' and First Congress members' rejection of imposition of
forfeiture as criminal penalty).
89. See U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 3, cI. 2 (prohibiting use of forfeiture as punishment
for crime of treason). The treason clause of the Constitution provides that "no attainder
of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person
attainted." Id.; see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing treason clause of
Constitution).
90. See J. MADISON, THs DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH
FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 430-435 (recounting debates
over treason clause in Constitutional Convention).
91. See id. (explaining debate over definition of treason during Constitutional Con-
vention). The debates during the Constitutional Convention reflect the Framers' concern
over adopting the narrow English treason definition of the Statute of 25 Edward III. Id.;
see generally HALE'S PLEAS OF THE CROWN *86 (advocating return to definition of treason
in Statute of 25 Edward III to avoid political use of treason penalties). The Statute of 25
Edward III defined treason in part as "the levying of war against the king" and "the
adhering to the king's enemies within the land or without, and declaring the same by some
overt-act." Id. at 91. The debate over the treason clause during the Constitutional Convention
centered on the meaning of the phrase "giving them aid and comfort" and the overt-act
requirements of the constitutional treason definition that the Framers proposed. MADISON,
supra note 90, at 431-433. Specifically, the Framers were concerned whether the Convention's
proposed definition of treason comported with the definition of the Statute of 25 Edward
III that Hale advocated. Id.
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James Madison, however, recognized the importance of limiting the pun-
ishment for treason in the Constitution to prevent the national government
from using treason convictions to eliminate political opponents of the
government.9 2 Madison and all the other Framers that spoke on the issue
believed that, unless the Constitution specifically defined the treason crime
and significantly curtailed the punishment for the offense of treason, the
government in power would use treason convictions to eliminate political
opponents of the government by sentencing the opponents to death and
forcing them to forfeit their estates to the government. 93 Consequently,
the treason clause of the Constitution prohibited forfeiture as a penalty
for treason.
94
Courts and scholars agree that prohibiting the imposition of forfeiture
as a penafty for treason necessarily prohibits the imposition of forfeiture
as a penalty for all lesser offenses. 9" Moreover, courts and scholars
92. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 219 (J. Madison) (Bantam Classic ed. 1982) (stating
that narrow definition of treason was necessary to prevent political holders of power from
falsely using treason offense to convict innocent political opponents); infra note 93 and
accompanying text (explaining Madison's opinion in FEDERALIST No. 43).
93. See id. (explaining reasons for Framers' narrow definition of treason in Consti-
tution). The text of the debates during the Constitutional Convention refers directly to the
importance of defining treason narrowly in the Constitution as Hale advocated in his
discussion of the Statute of 25 Edward III. MADISON, supra note 90, at 430. In advocating
a return to the Statute of 25 Edward III in England, Hale emphasized the necessity that
any definition of the treason crime provide a fixed offense with definite limits and bound-
aries. HALE'S PLEAS OF THE CROWN *86. Hale recognized that departing from the narrow
definition of the treason crime in the Statute of 25 Edward III could result in any crime
becoming a treason. Id. Hale emphasized further that expanding the crime of treason beyond
the letter of the law "admits of no limits or bounds, but runs as far as the wit and invention
of accusers." Id. at 87. Madison's justification for defining treason in the Constitution
reflects Hale's concerns. See FEDERALIST No. 43, at 219 (J. Madison) (Bantam Classic ed.
1982) (explaining that Framers defined treason in Constitution to avoid malicious prosecu-
tions attempting to extinguish political opposition). In explaining why the Framers defined
treason in the Constitution, Madison asserted that fabricated treason accusations have
constituted the instruments by which volatile political factions historically have attacked
each other's political power base. Id. Madison, therefore, shared Hale's concern that the
political factions in power would define treason broadly to eliminate their political opponents
through punishment by death and confiscation of property. Id. Accordingly, Madison and
the other Framers not only defined treason in the text of the Constitution, but prohibited
the use of forfeiture as a penalty for the crime to ensure further against possible political
abuse of fabricated treason accusations. Id.
94. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (stating that no conviction of treason shall
work corruption of blood or forfeiture).
95. See Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. 342, 347 (1870) (stating that no crime is greater
than treason); United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 (4th Cir. 1980) (determining
that treason clause rationally prohibits use of forfeiture of estate for all other crimes); I
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 603 (6th ed. 1877) (explaining that three
gradation of criminal offenses from highest to lowest are treason, felony, and misdemeanor);
HALE'S PLEAS OF THE CROWN *86 (stating that treason is highest of all crimes and requires
most severe penalties); MINOR, EXPOSITION OF THE LAW OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 16
(1894) (explaining three gradations of offenses and stating that treason is greatest of crimes
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generally perceive treason as the most egregious crime an individual can
commit. 96 Consequently, the treason crime warrants the most severe sanc-
tions that the law permits. 97 Thus, if the law does not permit a certain
penalty for treason, the law cannot permit use of that penalty for any
other crime. 98 Accordingly, courts and scholars have interpreted the treason
clause as prohibiting the English common-law use of forfeiture for all
crimes. 99
Like courts and scholars today, the First Congress of the United States
immediately recognized that forfeiture as a criminal penalty was not a
legitimate criminal punishment. 1°° As a result, in drafting the First Pun-
ishment of Crimes Bill in 1790, the First Congress expressly rejected the
use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty.10' The United States Senate first
appointed a committee to prepare a Punishment of Crimes Bill on May
13, 1789.102 The Senate committee presented and read the first Punishment
of Crimes Bill (S-2) on July 28, 1789.103 Originally, S-2 defined treason
and provided for punishment of traitors by both death and forfeiture to
warranting most severe of punishments); PERKiNs AND BOYD, C1W.IINAL LAW 13-15, 498-499
(3d ed. 1982) (explaining that treason is highest grade of offenses and that no crime is
greater than treason).
96. See supra note 95 (citing significant authority that treason is highest degree of
offense and greatest of all crimes).
97. See HALE'S PLEAS OF THE CROWN *86 (stating that treason is greatest crime against
faith, duty, and human society and requires most severe penalties);. MINOR, supra note 95,
at 16 (stating that treason requires most severe of all punishments).
98. See United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that
punishing lesser crimes than treason with penalty that Constitution expressly prohibits for
treason is plainly irrational). Because treason is the highest degree of offense warranting
the most severe penalties that law can provide, prohibiting a certain punishment for treason
necessarily prohibits implementing the punishment for all other crimes. See supra notes 95-
96 and accompanying text (explaining that treason is greatest of all crimes and is highest
degree of criminal offense); supra note 97 and accompanying text (explaining that treason
warrants most severe punishment law can provide).
99. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (explaining common perception of
courts and scholars that government cannot punish any crime with penalty that Constitution
prohibits for treason).
100. See infra notes 101-13 and accompanying text (explaining that First Congress
absolutely rejected use of forfeiture as criminal penalty); supra notes 37-41 and accompanying
text (explaining that First Congress' prohibition on use of forfeiture as criminal penalty
followed established trend in colonial jurisprudence).
101. See An Act For the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, 1st
Cong., 2nd Sess., Act of April 30, 1790 § 24 (prohibiting use of forfeiture as criminal
penalty for all federal crimes); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 2220 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (reproducing
First Punishment of Crimes Bill of 1790).
102. 3 L. DEPAUW, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 44, 51, 67 (Johns Hopkins University Press 1977). The Senate
Committee to draft the first Punishment of Crimes Bill consisted of five members who were
also Framers of the Constitution. See id. (listing members of Senate Committee to draft
Punishment of Crimes Bill); MADISON, supra note 90, at lxxxiii-lxxxv (listing members of
Constitutional Convention).
103. 3 DEPAUW, supra note 102, at 98.
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the state of the traitor's real and personal estate. 1°4 In amending the
treason section of S-2, the Senate eliminated the entire forfeiture penalty
and left only the death penalty as punishment for treason. 10 5 In addition,
the third section of S-2 punished wilful murder by putting the offender
to death and forcing the offender to forfeit his real and personal estate.
10 6
The Senate, however, amended section three, as the Senate amended the
treason section of S-2, to eliminate completely the forfeiture penalty and
left only the death penalty for wilful murder. 10 7 Similarly, the Senate
eliminated the forfeiture penalty from every other section of S-2, leaving
only the death penalty or a fine as punishment for federal crimes. 08
Finally, section 26 of S-2 originally stated
Provided Always (emphasis added), And Be It Enacted, That no
conviction or judgment for any of the offenses aforesaid, shall
work corruption of blood, nor shall any of the said offenses,
murder and forgery excepted, occasion (emphasis added) any for-
feiture of estate, longer than for the life of the person or persons
attainted (emphasis added). 0 9
The Senate amended section 26 by deleting the words "shall any of the
said offenses, murder and forgery excepted, occasion" and the words
"longer than for the life of the person or persons attainted," which
resulted in the absolute, express statutory prohibition of forfeiture as a
104. 6 C. BICKFORD AND H. VEIT, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1721 (Johns Hopkins University Press 1986).
105. Id. at 1721 n.5. Section 1 of the first Punishment of Crimes Bill, S-2, defined
treason in exactly the same terms as the treason clause of the Constitution. Id. at 1720.
The Senate Committee amended § l's penalty for treason by striking the phrase "shall
forfeit to the use of the United States all the estate real and personal, which he or they
had at the time of committing the treason aforesaid." Id. at 1721 n.5.
106. Id. at 1721.
107. Id. at 1721 n.9. The Senate Committee amended the punishment provision for
wilful murder in § 3 of S-2 by striking the phrase "and forfeit all the estate both real and
personal, which he or they had at the time of committing the crime." Id.
108. See id. at 1722-25 (detailing original text of S-2 and Senate Committee amendments
to the Bill). Section 8 of the first Punishment of Crimes Bill (S-2) imposed the penalty of
forfeiture upon all defendants guilty of any treason, murder, robbery, or other felony on
the high seas. Id. at 1722. The Senate Committee amended the penalty provision of § 8 by
striking the phrase "and forfeit his estate to the use of the United States." Id. at 1723
n.20. Section 9 of S-2 originally prescribed the forfeiture penalty for piracy as well. Id. at
1723. The Senate Committee, however, amended § 9 by striking the phrase "and forfeit all
his estate to the United States." Id. at 1723 n.22. In addition to § 8 and § 9, § 10 of S-2
originally imposed the penalty of forfeiture upon those aiding and abetting any treason,
murder, robbery, or other felony on the high seas. Id. at 1723. The Senate Committee,
however, amended the penalty provision of § 10 by striking the phrase "and the forfeiture
of his estate in like manner as the principals in such piracies." Id. at 1723 n.25. Last, the
Senate Committee amended the penalty provision for forgery and counterfeiting in § 14 of
S-2 by striking the phrase "and forfeit to the use of the United States the whole of his real
and personal estate." Id. at 1725 n.47.
109. Id. at 1729.
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penalty for any crime." 0 S-2 became positive law in the form of S-6, an
Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United States, on
April 30, 1790.111 Section 26 of S-2, as amended, became section 24 of S-
6, which Congress later codified in the United States Code at section 3563
of Title 18.112 As a result, the treason clause of the Constitution, together
with section 3563, prohibited forfeiture as a criminal penalty in the United
States until Congress implicitly repealed section 3563 in 1970.113
Significantly, section 3563 merely expressed the constitutional mandate
of the treason clause. 114 Because treason is the most severe crime an
individual can commit and because treason warrants the most severe
sanctions the law can provide, to prohibit a penalty for treason impliedly
prohibits use of the penalty for all other crimes." 5 The treason clause of
the Constitution prohibits the use of forfeiture as a punishment for
110. Id. at nn.79-80.
111. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, 1st
Cong., 2d Sess. Act of April 30, 1790 (S-6). When the First Senate reconvened for the
second session, the Senate appointed a new committee to draft a Punishment of Crimes Bill
on January 26, 1790. 3 DEPAUW, supra note 102, at 227. The Senate Committee consisted
of five members, and four of the members were also Framers of the Constitution. See id.
(listing members of second committee to draft Punishment of Crimes Bill); MADISON, supra
note 90, at lxxxiii-lxxxv (listing members of Constitutional Convention of 1787). On the
same day that the Senate appointed the members of the Committee, the Committee presented
the second Punishment of Crimes Bill (S-6), an amended version of S-2. Compare An Act
For the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. Act
of April 30, 1790, reprinted in 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 2215-2222 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (providing
final text of S-6) with 6 BICKFORD AND VErr, supra note 104, at 1720-1733 (providing text
of S-2, first Punishment of Crimes Bill, Act of July 1, 1789). The only Senate debate
surrounding S-6 concerned whether Congress should permit a surgeon to dissect for medical
purposes the body of an executed, convicted murderer. DEPAuw, supra note 102, at 230-
231; 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 1519-1522 (J. Gales ed. 1789). The House considered S-6 from
April 5, 1790 to April 9, 1790. DEPAuw, supra note 102, at 357-62. By deleting the phrase
"by being hanged" in all sections of S-6 that prescribed the death penalty, the House of
Representatives adjusted the language of S-6 only slightly. Id. at 286-87. The House did not
amend the language of the Act that expressly prohibited the use of forfeiture as a criminal
penalty. Id. The Senate agreed to the House of Representatives' minor amendments to S-6,
and President Washington signed the bill into law on April 30, 1790. Id. at 286-287, 295.
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of April 30, 1790, § 24)
(stating that no conviction or judgment shall result in corruption of blood or forfeiture of
estate).
113. See United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir. 1977) (recognizing that
use of forfeiture as criminal penalty was unknown in federal criminal law until Congress
enacted § 1963(a) of RICO in 1970); 1 BIsHOP, supra note 95, at § 920 (stating that as
result of treason clause and First Punishment of Crimes Bill, use of forfeiture as criminal
penalty is unknown in United States); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80 (1969)
(legislative history of RICO stating that use of forfeiture as criminal penalty is unprecedented
in American law); id. at 80 (stating that § 1963 impliedly repeals § 3563).
114. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (explaining constitutional mandate
of treason clause); supra notes 100-113 (explaining how First Congress followed mandate of
treason clause and prohibited forfeiture for all lesser crimes); infra notes 115-118 (same).
115. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (explaining implied meaning of
treason clause of Constitution).
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convicted traitors." 6 Section 3563's express prohibition on the use of
forfeiture as punishment for any federal crime, therefore, expressly stated
the treason clause's implied doctrine that use of forfeiture as a criminal
penalty is not constitutional.1 17 Any repeal of section 3563, therefore, is
necessarily repugnant to the implied meaning of the treason clause of the
Constitution."
8
The Fourth Circuit in Grande recognized that any repeal of section
3563 would be unconstitutional, but the Fourth Circuit nevertheless deter-
mined that RICO's criminal forfeiture penalty did not repeal section 3563's
prohibition of forfeiture as a criminal penalty. 19 The Fourth Circuit's
determination that section 1963 of RICO did not repeal section 3563 and
revive English common-law forfeiture was erroneous. 20 The Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, in its report on the legislative history of RICO,
stated that Congress derived section 1963's forfeiture penalty directly from
the same English common-law criminal penalty of forfeiture that section
3563 expressly prohibited.' 2' In fact, the Senate Report indicated that
Congress believed that section 1963 "revived" the English common-law
criminal penalty of forfeiture.122 Accordingly, when Congress enacted
116. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (stating that no conviction shall work corruption
of blood or forfeiture).
117. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (explaining that treason clause of
Constitution prohibits use of forfeiture as criminal penalty for all crimes less serious than
treason); An Act For the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, 1st
Cong., 2d Sess. Act of April 30, 1790 § 24 (following implied mandate of treason clause
by expressly prohibiting use of forfeiture as criminal penalty for all crimes); 18 U.S.C. §
3563 (1982) (codifying in United States Code § 24 of First Punishment of Crimes Bill).
118. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (explaining that treason clause
impliedly prohibits use of forfeiture as criminal penalty for all lesser crimes).
119. See United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038-39 (4th Cir. 1980) (discussing
effect of forfeiture penalty in § 1963 of RICO on § 3563 of Title 18 of United States Code);
supra notes 66-83 and accompanying text (explaining reasoning of Fourth Circuit in Grande).
120. See infra notes 121-27 (explaining that § 1963 of RICO repeals § 3563 of Title
18).
121. See S. RaP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80, 124-125, 160 (1969) (providing
legislative history of § 1963 of RICO). In its report, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
stated that Congress' use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty in § 1963 was an innovative
new penalty that Congress derived from the English common law. Id. at 79. The Senate
Committee on the Judiciary recognized that the use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty was
an English common-law concept that was unprecedented in American law until Congress
drafted RICO. Id. at 80. Moreover, the United States Department of Justice recognized
that § 1963's forfeiture penalty derived from English common-law practices that never
existed in the United States. See id. at 121-126 (reproducing letter of Deputy Attorney
General Richard G. Kleindienst to Senator McClellan of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, August 11, 1969).
122. See id. (stating that Congress derived imposition of forfeiture as criminal penalty
in § 1963 of RICO from English common law). The report of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on § 1963 of RICO expressly stated that Congress believed that Congress was
reviving the English common-law use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty by enacting § 1963.
Id. at 80. The United States Department of Justice also realized that RICO § 1963 revived
the English common-law imposition of forfeiture as a criminal penalty. See id. at 120-126
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RICO, Congress recognized that the RICO criminal penalty of forfeiture
impliedly repealed section 3563.123 Indeed, the Senate Report stated that
"18 U.S.C. § 3563, insofar as it is applicable to forfeiture is no longer
the law."11 24 The fact that Congress expressly repealed section 3563 when
amending RICO in 1984 further evidences the Grande court's erroneous
determination that RICO section 1963 does not repeal section 3563.125
Moreover, both the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit have
recognized that section 1963 necessarily repealed section 3563's prohibition
on the criminal penalty of forfeiture.1 26 Unlike the Grande court, however,
these courts and Congress failed to recognize that, because section 3563
merely expressed the necessary implications of the treason clause, any
penalty that repeals section 3563 would be repugnant to the Constitution.
127
In addition to-underestimating the historical background of the Fram-
ers' and First Congress' prohibition on the use of forfeiture as a criminal
penalty, the Grande court ignored the significant historical distinction
between permissible civil seizure and the outlawed criminal penalty of
forfeiture.1 28 Both the district court in Thevis and the Fourth Circuit in
Grande erroneously relied on the civil seizure sanction to justify section
(reproducing August 11, 1969 letter of Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst to
Senator McClellan of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
123. See id. (stating that by implication § 1963 of RICO repealed § 3563 of Title 18).
The Senate Committee's report on RICO recognized that § 3563 of Title 18 prohibited the
English common-law use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty. Id. Furthermore, the report
acknowledged that § 1963 of RICO revived forfeiture as a criminal penalty. Id. at 80.
Accordingly, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary noted that section 1963(a) repealed 18
U.S.C. § 3563 by implication. Id. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary determined that
"18 U.S.C. § 3563, insofar as it is applicable to forfeiture is no longer the law." Id. at
160. The United States Department of Justice reached the same conclusion as the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary. See id. at 120-126 (reproducing letter of August 11, 1969 from
Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst to Senator McClellan of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary). Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst determined
that because § 3563 of Title 18 had prohibited the use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty
in the United States from 1789 to 1969, the revival of the English common-law use of
forfeiture as a criminal penalty in § 1963 of RICO repealed § 3563 by implication. Id. at
124-125.
124. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 160 (1969).
125. See Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, c. II, § 212(a)(2), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1987
(expressly repealing § 3563 of Title 18).
126. See United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 927 (1980) (stating that by implication § 1963 of RICO repealed § 3563 of Title 18);
United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir. 1977) (recognizing that use of forfeiture
as criminal penalty is unprecedented in United States, and stating that 91st Congress
recognized that it was repealing § 3563 by passing § 1963).
127. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (explaining that any repeal of § 3563
is repugnant to treason clause of Constitution).
128. See infra notes 129-136 and accompanying text (explaining significant historical
distinction between civil seizure and use of forfeiture as criminal penalty).
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1963's imposition of forfeiture as a penalty for violations of RICO. 2 9
Both courts drew analogies between the forfeiture provision in section
1963 and the civil "forfeiture" sanction of state seizure of tainted prop-
erty. 30 Analogizing the criminal penalty of forfeiture to civil seizure,
however, is inappropriate.' 3' Civil actions by the United States government
against guilty property have been a part of American law since the
colonization of the United States. 13 2 Forfeiture under section 1963, in
contrast, is a mandatory criminal penalty, unprecedented in American
jurisprudence, that the government imposes upon a defendant upon con-
victing the defendant of a racketeering felony offense. 3  Section 1963 is
not a civil sanction. 34 Both the Fourth Circuit in Grande and the district
129. See United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that no
significant difference existed between use of forfeiture as criminal penalty and civil seizure);
United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 140 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (stating that imposition of
forfeiture as criminal penalty in § 1963 of RICO resembles civil seizure of instrumentalities
of crime); supra notes 80, 81 and accompanying text (explaining Fourth Circuit's attempt
to analogize civil seizure to RICO forfeiture in Grande); supra notes 62-64 and accompanying
text (explaining Thevis court's analogy of civil seizure to RICO forfeiture); supra notes 20-
28 and accompanying text (explaining significant historical distinction between civil seizure
and use of forfeiture as criminal penalty).
130. See Grande, 620 F.2d at 1039 (stating that forfeiture penalty in § 1963 of RICO
is equivalent to civil seizure and that no significant difference exists between use of forfeiture
as criminal penalty and civil seizure); Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 140 (comparing use of
forfeiture as criminal penalty in § 1963 of RICO to civil seizure); supra notes 80-81 and
accompanying text (explaining Fourth Circuit analogy in Grande); supra notes 62-64 and
accompanying text (explaining Thevis court's comparison).
131. See infra notes 132-136 (explaining that analogy of civil seizure to criminal use of
forfeiture is unfounded).
132. See C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 137-153 (1943) (explaining that
American colonists practiced civil seizure and that civil seizure constituted part of common
law in America at time of adoption of Constitution); J.W. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-513 (1921) (explaining history and nature of civil seizure); The
Palmyra, 25 U.S. 12 Wheat. 1, *14-*16 (1827) (distinguishing civil seizure from use of
forfeiture as criminal penalty and explaining civil seizure sanction); Customs and Revenue
Acts, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. Act of July 31, 1789 §§ 12, 36 (enacting civil seizure sanctions
for violation of customs laws); Customs and Revenue Acts, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. Act of
August 4, 1790 §§ 13, 22, 27-28, 67 (providing for civil seizure of articles that violated the
customs and revenue laws); Maxeiner, supra note 24, at 779-780 (explaining early use of
civil seizure in United States); Taylor, Forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963-RICO's Most
Powerful Weapon, 17 AM. CR. L. REV. 379, 380 (explaining that civil seizure was in use at
time Congress enacted RICO); Winters, supra note 58, at 459-460 (explaining that use of
civil seizure has existed throughout United States' legal history); supra notes 44-45 and
accompanying text (explaining that civil seizure always has constituted part of American
law).
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982) (requiring forfeiture as mandatory criminal penalty
upon conviction under § 1962 of RICO of racketeering felony); compare 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)
(1982) (describing RICO forfeiture as criminal penalty that is mandatory upon conviction
of racketeering offense) with supra notes 20-28 (explaining that civil seizure is civil action
against tainted property completely independent of criminal proceeding).
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982) (requiring courts to impose mandatory criminal
penalty of forfeiture upon finding that criminal defendant is guilty of RICO racketeering
offense).
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court in Thevis, therefore, incorrectly analogized RICO forfeiture to civil
seizure. 35 Such an analogy cannot justify RICO forfeiture.
1 36
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Grande and the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia in Thevis wrongly determined
that the scope of RICO forfeiture, although criminal in nature, is as
narrow as the scope of the civil forfeiture sanction of seizing the instru-
mentalities of a crime. 37 Civil forfeiture is a civil action by the government
against only those specific articles that an individual used illegally, as in
the example of a yacht used to smuggle narcotics into the United States.3 8
The civil sanction is unrelated to any criminal proceeding, and seizure
extends to only the specific articles that the law considers tainted by illegal
use. 139 The illegal use of the property triggers the seizure.
140
RICO forfeiture, in contrast, encompasses more than property that a
criminal offender used illegally.' 4' RICO forfeiture is a criminal penalty
that extends to untainted property. 42 For example, a shopkeeper may
conduct an honest business for forty years, but subject his entire business
to RICO forfeiture by committing a single act of mail fraud. 43 Under
135. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text (explaining that civil seizure is
significantly distinct from criminal forfeiture and that civil seizure is completely unrelated
to imposition of forfeiture as criminal penalty). Although the Fourth Circuit in Grande
determined that the distinction between imposition of forfeiture as a criminal penalty and
civil seizure of the instrumentalities of a crime is insignificant, the Framers of the Consti-
tution and members of the First Congress made this very same distinction in determining
permissible and impermissible uses of forfeiture by enacting civil seizure sanctions and
prohibiting use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 3, cI. 2
(prohibiting use of forfeiture as criminal penalty for treason); Customs and Revenue Act,
1st Cong., 1st Sess. Act of July 31, 1789 §§ 12, 36 (providing civil seizure sanctions for
violating customs laws); Customs and Revenue Act, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. Act of August 4,
1790 §§ 13, 22, 27-28, 67 (providing civil seizure sanctions for violating customs laws); An
Act For the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, 1st Cong., 2d Sess.
Act of April 30, 1790 § 24 (prohibiting use of forfeiture as criminal penalty for all federal
crimes); supra notes 88-127 (explaining historical significance of treason clause and First
Congress' Act of April 30, 1790).
136. See supra notes 128-135 and accompanying text (explaining that analogy of civil
seizure to use of forfeiture as criminal penalty is unfounded).
137. See United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir. 1980) (determining
that RICO forfeiture encompasses only forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime); United
States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 141 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (determining that RICO forfeiture
includes only property that offender used to commit crime); infra notes 138-48 (explaining
that § 1963 of RICO extends beyond mere instrumentalities of crime).
138. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (providing example of civil seizure).
139. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text (explaining nature of civil seizure
sanction).
140. Id.
141. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1986) (extending scope of RICO forfeiture
penalty to profits and to property acquired legitimately with those profits).
142. Id.
143. See Taylor, supra note 132, at 389-90 (explaining shopkeeper example); Winters,
supra note 58, at 473 (describing shopkeeper example); Note, supra note 24, at 1935 (using
shopkeeper example).
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section 1963, the convicted shopkeeper would forfeit all property that the
shopkeeper obtained with profits that the shopkeeper derived from his
business, now tainted by the shopkeeper's act of mail fraud. 44 Such
property, however, might include personal property completely untainted
by illegal use in the crime. 45 The shopkeeper's forfeitable interest could
extend to legitimately acquired assets that constituted the shopkeeper's
entire life's earnings. 146 The attempts of the Thevis court and the Grande
court to justify RICO forfeiture by emphasizing that the RICO penalty
extends only to the instrumentalities of a crime is plainly wrong. 47 RICO
forfeiture is a criminal penalty that can cause a convicted offender to
forfeit untainted assets that may constitute the offender's life's earnings. 14
Although American jurisprudence since the early colonial period has
embraced the English common-law theory that allows a government to
seize the instrumentalities of a crime, the imposition of forfeiture as a
criminal penalty was unknown to American law until Congress enacted
section 1963 of RICO in 1970.149 Section 1963 first impliedly then expressly
repealed the First Congress' 180 year-old prohibition on the use of for-
feiture as a criminal penalty. 50 Because the First Congress' prohibition on
the use of forfeiture as a criminal penalty merely expressed the necessary
implications of the treason clause, any repeal of this prohibition is nec-
144. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1986) (extending RICO forfeiture to all
property that offender obtains directly or indirectly with proceeds from tainted enterprise).
Although § 1963(a)(3) of RICO appears to apply only to fruits of a crime, in reality, the
scope of § 1963(a)(3) extends beyond the fruits of a crime; for example, a shopkeeper who
generates a minimal amount of business profits through committing mail fraud subjects all
property that the shopkeeper obtains with profits from his business to RICO forfeiture,
despite the fact that only a small percentage of those profits resulted from the RICO
violation of mail fraud. See Note, supra note 24, at 1935 (explaining that in shopkeeper
example, RICO forfeiture extends to shopkeeper's entire life's earnings).
145. See Note, supra note 24, at 1935 (explaining that RICO forfeiture extends to
legitimately acquired assets).
146. See id. (explaining that shopkeeper who commits single instance of business fraud
subjects entire life's earnings to RICO forfeiture).
147. See supra notes 138-146 and accompanying text (explaining that RICO forfeiture
encompasses more than instrumentalities of crime by extending to untainted property as
well).
148. See supra notes 141-147 (explaining broad scope of RICO forfeiture); compare
supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (explaining that RICO forfeiture is mandatory
criminal penalty that can cause forfeiture of offender's life's earnings) with supra notes 1-
2 and accompanying text (explaining that English common-law criminal forfeiture is man-
datory criminal penalty that can cause forfeiture of offender's real and personal estate).
149. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (explaining that American common
law embraced civil seizure sanction); supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text (explaining
that treason clause, together with § 24 of First Punishment of Crimes Bill resulted in
prohibition of forfeiture as criminal penalty in United States until Congress enacted RICO
in 1970).
150. See S. REp. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1969) (stating that § 1963 of RICO
revives English common-law use of forfeiture as criminal penalty, thus impliedly repealing
§ 3563 of Title 18); Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, c. II, § 212(a)(2), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1987
(expressly repealing § 3563 of Title 18).
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essarily repugnant to the treason clause.51 Despite constitutional attacks
on section 1963 of RICO, however, courts in the United States unfortu-
nately have failed to realize the constitutional infirmity that RICO forfei-
ture presents.' 52 Consequently, courts have helped legitimate an
unconstitutional criminal penalty that is becoming entrenched in modern
American law."
53
MICHAEL PAUL AUSTERN COHEN
151. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (explaining that treason clause of
Constitution impliedly prohibits use of forfeiture as criminal penalty for all crimes less
serious than treason); supra notes 100-118 and accompanying text (explaining that § 3563
of Title 18 of the United States Code expressly states implications of treason clause by
prohibiting use of forfeiture for all federal crimes); supra note 118 and accompanying text
(explaining that any criminal penalty that repeals § 3563 is necessarily repugnant to treason
clause of Constitution).
152. See supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text (explaining failure of courts in
United States to realize that § 1963 of RICO is repugnant to treason clause of Constitution).
153. See supra notes 66-83 and accompanying text (explaining how Fourth Circuit has
upheld constitutionality of § 1963 of RICO despite arguments that treason clause prohibits
use of forfeiture as criminal penalty).
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